Agent-based simulation of lock-in dynamics in a duopoly by Garlick, Michael & Chli, Maria
Agent-based simulation of lock-in dynamics in a duopoly 
 
Michael Garlick, Maria Chli 
Aston University 
Birmingham, UK 
{garlicmj, m.chli}@aston.ac.uk  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Lock-in is observed in real world markets of experience goods; 
experience goods are goods whose characteristics are difficult to 
determine in advance, but ascertained upon consumption. We 
create an agent-based simulation of consumers choosing between 
two experience goods available in a virtual market.  We model 
consumers in a grid representing the spatial network of the 
consumers. Utilising simple assumptions, including identical 
distributions of product experience and consumers having a 
degree of follower tendency, we explore the dynamics of the 
model through simulations. We conduct simulations to create a 
lock-in before testing several hypotheses upon how to break an 
existing lock-in; these include the effect of advertising and free 
give-away. Our experiments show that the key to successfully 
breaking a lock-in required the creation of regions in a consumer 
population. Regions arise due to the degree of local conformity 
between agents within the regions, which spread throughout the 
population when a mildly superior competitor was available. 
These regions may be likened to a niche in a market, which gains 
in popularity to transition into the mainstream. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.6.5 [Simulation and Modelling]: Model Development, 
Modelling methodologies.  
J.4 [Social and Behavioural Sciences]: Economics, Sociology. 
General Terms 
Experimentation, Human Factors, Economics 
Keywords 
Agent-based simulation, consumer behaviour, lock-in. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The term lock-in is used to describe a situation where a single 
product dominates a market place. The dominance of a lone 
product ensures that competing products find it difficult to capture 
any significant market share. Frequent examples of a lock-in 
found in literature revolve around the QWERTY keyboard layout 
[7] and the VCR format [1][2]. The QWERTY keyboard layout 
has been claimed to be less efficient than alternatives, yet it has 
remained the dominating keyboard layout in current use; David’s 
paper [7] provides a discussion of QWERTY’s prevalence. The 
VCR format “war” between Betamax and VHS has also been 
repeatedly cited as an example of how an inferior product 
managed to dominate in a market place.  
Economists have studied the lock-in effect with great interest, 
identifying a variety of areas and factors that may contribute to 
the development of a lock-in and whether a lock-in may be 
recognised in advance, or how sub-optimal choices may become 
locked in despite the knowledge of superior alternatives [1-3]; 
these will be examined in more detail in section 2. 
We are interested in the contribution the choices made by a 
consumer  have during the formation or maintenance of a lock-in, 
and breaking the lock-in. Economics and psychology have 
contributed extensively to studies of the lock-in effect and how a 
lock-in may occur. Simulations have formed an integral part of 
previous publications [1], playing a key role in examining the 
dynamics that lead to lock-in, but without investigation into 
breaking a lock-in. Carrillo-Hermosialla and Unruh [5] examine 
the technological standards of succession dynamics of markets 
involving technology innovators and producers through use of an 
agent-based simulation, which includes aspects breaking a lock-
in. 
In this paper we create an agent-based simulation of a market, 
consisting of consumers and two products competing for their 
custom. The consumers make repeat purchases, selecting the most 
suitable product based upon their perception of the product’s 
quality and their conformity to their neighbours’ choices. We 
simulate the market to examine dynamics of a lock-in, and then 
test various hypotheses on their effectiveness in breaking the lock-
in. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a 
background of research related to the lock-in effect, with a focus 
upon prior simulation models. We discuss the motivation for the 
simulation and a brief explanation of how we achieve our goals. 
Section 3 presents the consumer model utilised in the simulations 
and the assumptions we make. Section 4 presents the sensitivity 
analysis of the model, and discusses the relevance of the findings. 
In section 5 we highlight the experiments to test the model and 
various hypothesises to break a lock-in. The results are discussed 
in section 6, with section 7 concluding. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Several types of lock-in have been identified from the literature. 
At a market level a lock-in is where a single product dominates 
the market place, and the reversal of the dominance is unlikely to 
occur [15]. At an individual consumer level, a lock-in is where a 
product has an initial investment or set-up cost, and an ongoing 
cost of use. Researchers in the fields of economics and 
psychology have identified several reasons why a lock-in may be 
generated, such as path dependency (historical events), 
proprietary factors and cognitive behaviour.  
In the literature Arthur [1] conducted a simulation of path 
dependency, examining how increasing returns can lead to a lock-
in.  Under increasing returns, the more adopters of a particular 
technology or product, the greater the improvement may be made 
to the technology and the product may capture the market. Initial 
advantage over a competitor may be due to innocuous events, 
leading to the lock-in; under different circumstances, a different 
outcome may occur. Path dependency, or historical events [1], is 
the distinction that the prior history of events determines the 
outcome. Katz and Shapiro [13] noted that products exist where 
the utility upon consumption of a product increases with the 
number of other agents consuming the product. Similarly, the 
bandwagon effect [14] is where consumers may purchase an 
alternative based upon other consumers’ decisions, without having 
prior experience; both [13][14] are examples of network 
externalities, where a network externality is effect one user of a 
product has on the value of that product to others.  
Proprietary lock-in is where purchasing a particular product 
results in a consumer being dependent upon the producer for 
services, products or component parts. An example of such 
proprietary lock-in was Apple’s iTunes and iPod player, where 
iTunes purchases were encoded in a proprietary format, ensuring 
only Apple products may play the music (iPod). Consumers are 
subsequently locked into Apple products unless the consumer 
pays a significant switching cost for both player and music to an 
alternative format; proprietary lock-in is closely linked to 
cognitive lock-in.  
Cognitive lock-in involves a learning process, which is both the 
initial investment and ongoing usage cost. The amount of thinking 
required to utilise a process may be great at the start, but as 
familiarity through repeated usage occurs, it decreases the amount 
of thinking required in order using the process. This creates the 
cognitive lock-in, a barrier between using a known product and 
learning a new product [12]. 
A distinction between the above factors may have become 
apparent. Proprietary lock-in exists when an individual consumer 
is locked into a product or service; the decisions made by others 
may not be a factor. Network externalities are where a consumer 
makes the best decision they can, which can be impacted upon by 
the decisions of others. We are interested in the dynamics of lock-
in, particularly how the tendency to follow trends can cause 
regularities to appear in the global market, and how those 
regularities may be broken. Network externalities as outlined 
above features strongly in this type of model, whereas proprietary 
lock-in will not feature. 
2.1 Existing lock-in models 
Arthur’s [1] simple model of a duopoly featured two types of 
homogeneous consumer, where each type of consumer has a 
preference for a different product. The consumer chooses 
according to their product preferences under conditions of 
increasing, decreasing and constant returns. Arthur found that in 
markets with decreasing or constant returns an equal market share 
must be achieved with probability of 1. In markets with increasing 
returns, there is a path dependency; the outcome is determined by 
“small events history” as Arthur terms it, the order in which 
agents make their decision.  
Janssen and Jager [11] developed a multi-agent simulation model 
with a psychological perspective upon the consumer decision. 
Janssen and Jager fuse together various cognitive behavioural 
theories to focus upon understanding how behavioural processes 
drive consumer decisions as they claim economic approaches give 
little insight into how the decisions are made. They conclude that 
different patterns of consumption can emerge based upon the 
overall needs of consumers – such as low prices, high social 
comparison, and the type of cognitive processing consumers 
utilise. 
Carrillo-Hermosialla and Unruh [5] created a multi-agent 
simulation model featuring a market of multiple products, where 
innovators and producers interact and enable the evolution of 
technological standards through diffusion of innovations in the 
product creation processes. Whilst their model features lock-in to 
technologies, and how a lock-in is broken during evolution of the 
technology, the dynamics are applicable to product production 
scenarios. 
2.2 Motivation 
Our motivation is to test various methods for breaking a lock-in of 
a market to a single product, where such market domination stifles 
competition and limits consumer’s ability to receive value for 
money. We require a market simulation consisting of consumers 
making repeat purchases, enabling us to test the effectiveness of 
our hypotheses for breaking a lock-in.  
Arthur’s [1] model, which always generates a lock-in when 
simulating a market of increasing returns, consists of a single 
iteration of homogeneous consumer decisions based on product 
preference and increasing returns during a simulation. Arthur’s 
model indicates the minimal assumptions required to simulate a 
market to lock-in. 
Janssen and Jager’s [11] model focuses on the behavioural 
process that underpins a decision made by the consumer. This is 
based upon complex assumptions with regards to consumers 
having four types of decision making choices in their repertoire, 
and the underlying cause of transitions between these types.  
Our intention is to create model of a duopoly, which is able to 
simulate a lock-in of the market to one product. To achieve this 
we create heterogeneous consumers, bounded in their rationality 
and responsive to network externalities. A consumer’s decision is 
based upon product utility, with the utility calculation including 
the consumer’s perception of product quality, and their tendency 
to follow trends within a localised population. We simulate a 
lock-in before attempting to break it through two hypothesised 
methods: advertising and free give-away. To the best of our 
knowledge a simulation incorporating a break of lock-in, through 
testing and evaluation of various hypotheses for their 
effectiveness, is unique within the fields of multi-agent 
simulation, and economics.  
3. SIMULATION MODEL 
The simulation revolves around a market duopoly where we 
attempt to break a lock-in enjoyed by a single product. We assume 
products are identical, with no constraint or costs considerations 
(economies of scale, production limitations etc) and of identical 
monetary value. We therefore focus upon the interacting 
dynamics of consumers decisions. 
The consumer calculates a utility value for each product available, 
and selects the product with the highest utility, where the utility is 
the consumer’s derived personal pleasure. The utility depends 
upon the perception of the product quality and decisions of 
neighbours. Our model, shown in (1), is a general model, and does 
not describe scenarios of specific product type. 
  (1) 
  is the consumer’s utility of product , where  and  
is the set of all products. 
  is the follower tendency of the consumer, with a value in 
the range . 
 is the consumer’s experienced quality of product  (the 
taste) and has a value in the range . 
 , the consumer’s minimum satisfaction quality. 
 is the number of neighbours within the Moore 
neighbourhood of range 1 when considering a local, or all the 
consumers in the simulation when considering a global, 
network who selected product . 
  defines the total number products purchased 
by all consumers in the neighbourhood. 
We made six assumptions with regards to a consumers purchase 
decision: 
1. Every consumer assumes all products are of equal quality at 
the start of a simulation. 
2. Product experience is gained upon first consuming a product. 
3. Consumers desire products to have a minimum quality ( ) 
in order to be satisfied with a product. 
4. Consumers have different levels to which they follow or 
conform to their social network (represented by ). 
5. Purchase decisions made by others within their 
neighbourhood are viewable. 
6. Every consumer regards the members of their network 
equally, and network size is homogeneous for all agents. 
The second assumption indicates consumers will only gain their 
accurate appraisal of a product’s quality  after they have 
purchased the product itself. Assumption three follows as we 
consider bounded rationality and satisficing theories [17], where 
Herbert Simon exposits that decision makers select a “good 
enough” option to satisfy their requirements. It follows that if the 
consumer’s first experience exceeds the minimum quality 
criteria, , then dependent upon follower tendency, 
the consumer will repeat their purchase without further 
exploration of the available products. 
The fourth assumption is based upon a population of consumers 
being heterogeneous; therefore the tendency to follow a trend will 
differ between consumers. A strong follower tendency may cause 
a consumer purchase a product that they do not believe to be good 
quality; with no follower tendency consumers will always 
purchase the product they perceive to have the best quality. The 
fifth assumption follows from the third, that consumers know the 
consumption choices of others within their network. The sixth 
assumption follows that every consumer regards the members of 
their network equally. 
Equation (1) is similar in nature to Arthur’s [1], but we model the 
consumer decision as a fusion of the individual element and 
conformity to the peer network, whereas in [1] decisions are 
modelled as homogeneous preferences and path dependency 
linked to increasing returns. We draw parallels between our model 
and Arthur’s; the differences, however subtle, are significant. 
Increasing returns is defined by Arthur [1] as where the more the 
products are adopted, the more they are improved. Arthur’s model 
consists of two homogeneous populations of agents, and relies 
more upon the product or producer market factors than consumer 
decisions. With increasing returns Arthur abstracted the 
improvement of a product to the number of consumers adopting 
the product. This assumes that agents know the product choices of 
all other agents in the environment, and improvements are 
proportional to consumption. 
We model a heterogeneous population of agents and focus upon 
the consumer’s decision at the micro level and the overall macro 
level these individual decisions exhibit. Recognising that the 
utility of a product may increase as the number of consumers of 
the product increases [14], we differ to Arthur by incorporating 
network externalities and assuming consumers are bounded in 
their ability to see neighbours’ decisions. We therefore liken 
increasing returns to conformity, a process by which actions may 
be influenced by the actions or decisions of taken by others [6], 
which will add flexibility to our model. Conformity is closer to 
Katz and Shapiro’s [13] definition seen in Section 2, and echoes 
Carrillo-Hermosilla and Unruh [5] observation that there exist 
“situations in which it is optimal for an individual, having 
observed the actions of those going before, to follow the 
behaviour of the preceding individual without considering his own 
information”. 
We justify the flexibility of conformity as follows: specific market 
types may lead to differing levels of conformity in a population, 
as some items define social status. Examples of this are fashion 
clothing or items, where there is a stronger emphasis on following 
a trend, or a white goods market, where the goods play little part 
in the public status of the consumer and therefore exhibit a lower 
follower tendency.  
To enable conformity in the model we create an abstract social 
network for the consumers. Consumers may then consider the 
consumption choices of others in their utility calculation, 
tempered by the heterogeneous degree to which they conform. 
This abstract conformance network is similar in principle to 
previous work by Epstein [9], where agents conformed to the 
prevalent norm within their surroundings. We differ as consumers 
do not adapt their consideration range, and we utilise a different 
network type. Our consumers will be located in a torus grid, 
where their surrounding Moore neighbourhood with range 1 will 
represent the consumer’s social network or peer group, to which 
they belong. We will contrast this in our experiments with 
consumers considering all members of the population (Moore 
neighbourhood = radius of grid).  
In this section we discussed and contrasted the differences in 
assumptions, such as locally bounded heterogeneous consumer 
conformity in a grid network, identical product quality 
distributions and heterogeneous consumers. We place the 
emphasis upon the consumers’ decisions, with the torus grid 
network providing a suitable abstract representation of a peer 
network. This allows us to examine the dynamics and spatial 
patterns of consumption and interaction instead of the abstract 
overall market share without the consumer interaction 
consideration. While we do not focus our attention on specific 
market of products, our model is simple and flexible enough to be 
applicable to any market due to conformity. The model will allow 
us to observe the simple dynamics involved in breaking a lock-in, 
without examining the complex causes and assumptions e.g. of 
technological standards succession and innovation diffusion, 
switching costs and cognitive processing. 
4. EXPERIMENTS 
First we outline the initial variables and conditions for a 
simulation before analysing the model behaviour. 
4.1 Initial settings and variables 
The consumer experience of a product, or their perception of the 
product quality, is represented by . The quality 
experienced by the consumer upon the initial purchase of a 
product is drawn from a normal distribution; this allows for 
consumers to have heterogeneous tastes. We refer to this as the 
product distribution, with the parameters of the distribution stated 
in the experiment settings in Tables 1, 3 and 4. With identical 
distributions for two products we assume that both products are 
perceived to be equal in quality; however the individual taste 
experience allows each consumer to distinguish between the two 
products. Later experiments there may be product inequality, but 
this will be clarified in the corresponding sections. 
At initialisation consumers have no prior experience of the 
products and the first assumption of the consumer purchase 
decision holds. At initialisation each consumer is given a random 
product from the set of available products ; the consumer does 
not experience this product until they purchase it. Follower 
tendency for each consumer is drawn from a distribution, where 
the distribution is referred to as the follower tendency distribution. 
The social network for consumers may be of two types: A local 
social network, where only the consumers in the consumer’s 
immediate Moore neighbourhood of range 1 are considered; or a 
global social network, where all consumers in the population are 
considered to have equal impact on the consumer’s decision. This 
latter network is more representative of Arthur’s [1] global 
knowledge of individual purchases and contrasts against our 
consumers bounded rationality. 
4.2 Model Behaviour 
Sensitivity analysis will allow us to determine how the variables 
affect the creation of, or cause, a lock-in; the role that they play in 
the dynamics. We test the effect of the network type upon the 
model, simulating both types of network, and compare the results. 
We investigate how the model responds to follower tendency by 
modelling two specific types of abstract market; one requiring a 
low follower tendency and the other requiring high follower 
tendency. We conclude sensitivity analysis by investigating how 
the model behaves with products that are not equal in quality. 
Table 1: The settings for sensitivity analysis conducted in experiments 
1-6. The table shows the distribution for product quality, follower 
tendency and the network the consumer considers. 
Expt Product quality 
distribution 
 
Follower tendency 
distribution 
Network 
1   Local 
2   Global 
3   Local  
4   Global 
5   Local 
6   Global 
We outline the settings for network and follower tendency 
experiments in Table 1, where we show the distributions from 
which consumer variables were drawn and the network type 
considered by each consumer. Every simulation consists of 1000 
steps and is repeated 20 times. The results of the experiments 
were collected, correlated and presented in tables. The results 
tables are presented in individual sub-sections, for clarity, and the 
columns indicate the experiment, the mean market share of 
product A ( ), and product B ( ) as a ratio, and the standard 
deviation from the mean share.  The final column of the results 
table will indicate observations noted during the experiments that 
would not be otherwise discernable.  
4.3 Network type and follower tendency. 
Network effects were investigated in experiment 1 and 2, and 
results shown in Table 2. The results for experiment 1, where 
consumers consider a local network, show that the market share is 
approximately 50:50. Under a local network no product 
successfully gains an overall lock-in of the market; either product 
may obtain a majority market share, or no majority may exist. 
Experiment 2 resulted in a lock-in, to either product, dependent 
upon initial product prevalence. 
Table 2: Results of experiments 1 and 2, where consumers are 
considering different neighbourhood networks during their choice, 
and 3-6, where follower tendency distributions are altered. 
Expt  :  σ Lock-in? Observations 
1 55:45 15 No Spatial lock-in occurs 
2 100:0 or 
0:100 
0.26 Yes A or B global lock-in. 
3 50:50 3 No No spatial regularities 
4 50:50 16 No Equilibrium, no lock-in 
5 50:50 23 No Strong spatial 
regularities 
6 100:0 or 
0:100 
0 Yes A or B global lock-in 
 
The spatial representation of the simulation, shown in figure 2, 
allows us to observe a spatial pattern of consumption during the 
simulation. Each of the images represents the grid of consumers, 
with each square in the grid representing a consumer; the colour 
of the consumer represents the product being consumed. The first 
image is the initial state of the market, followed by the end state, 
given as the second image.  
The spatial correlation between consumers’ decisions and the 
overall market share show that, despite product equality, 
interesting spatial patterns of product choice occur due to the 
network effects.  Consumers form regions that exhibit lock-in to a 
single product; Janssen and Jager [11] refer to this as local or 
regional lock-in.  
        
Figure 1: The spatial results of an Experiment 1 simulation run. The 
starting state is the left image, the finishing state on the right. The 
results show regions of a localised lock-in to a single product.  
Even though we designed a model that does not describe a 
specific type of market, we have carried out experiments with 
parameters to simulate some aspects of specific market types. 
Alterations to the mean of the follower tendency allow us to 
simulate two abstract specific market types, one where consumers 
conform strongly, and the alternative where consumers conform 
weakly. With a low mean for the follower tendency distribution, 
consumers will not consider the decisions of others strongly 
during their choice. With a high mean for the follower tendency 
distribution, consumers will have a higher follower tendency, and 
the decisions of others will strongly affect their choice. 
Experiments 3 and 4, shown in table 1, represent the settings for 
low conformity under local and global network types respectively. 
Experiments 5 and 6 represent a high conformity market under 
local and global networks respectively, where consumers may 
find their status is defined by conforming to their peer network. 
In the simulated low conformity market (experiments 3 and 4) we 
find no lock-in exists, and the market remains in an equilibrium 
without any spatial patterns of purchases. The high conformity 
market shows strong regions of lock-in under local network 
effects (experiment 5), and a global lock-in to one product under 
global networks (experiment 6).  
4.4 Superior competition  
Economists find interest in perceived irregularities that permeate 
market behaviour. An example is the ability for a market to 
become locked into an inferior product. Experiments 7 and 8 test 
the model where a product is available that exceeds a competitor 
in quality. With a superior product being available to the 
consumer, we see whether it is possible for the market to lock into 
the inferior product, and if so, what dynamics caused this to occur. 
At the start of the simulation for experiment 7 both products are 
viewed as equal until experienced . Experiment 
8 has altered this assumption so that ; the consumers 
therefore believe B to be superior.  
Table 3 Product B is superior to Product A. Superiority is only 
realised through consumption in experiment 5, superiority is known 
from the start in experiment 6. 
Expt QA  distribution QB distribution Follower tendency 
distribution 
7    
8    
Table 3 shows the experiment settings, giving the distributions 
used for the quality a consumer experiences upon consumption of 
a product and follower tendency. The results are shown in table 4. 
Table 4: Results from experiments 7 and 8, where consumers are 
choosing between goods that are not equal. During experiment 7 
consumers must consume the superior product to realise its quality, 
whereas experiment 8 starts with consumers knowing it should be 
superior. 
Expt Network  :   σ Lock-in? Observations 
7 Local 22:78 14 No A retains 
small pockets 
of regional 
lock-in. 
7 Global 100:0 or 
0:100 
0 Yes A or B global 
lock-in 
8 Local 0:100 0 Yes Global lock-in 
8 Global 0:100 0 Yes Global lock-in 
We observe that local network effects allow regionalised lock-ins 
of product A (inferior product) to occur and persist in experiment 
7. We hypothesise that consumers become unwittingly locked into 
the inferior choice due to conformity in the initial stages of a 
simulation; the local lock-in is path dependent without switching 
costs. In a global network we find that the model shows an 
inferior product may gain the entire market majority based on the 
chance superior share at the start. These results are due to the 
bandwagon effect [14], previously explained in section 2.  
Experiment 8, where consumers know the superiority at the 
simulation initialisation, we find that, as expected, the superior 
product dominates the market place under both network types. 
The market will, given an equal initial distribution of products, 
always lock-in to the superior product when the consumers know 
the superior product in advance. 
A small extension was then undertaken, for Experiment 7, with 
the expectation (  of a consumer elevated from 0.5, to 0.6. 
This would mean that, for the majority of the population, product 
A would be below their expectation threshold. The result was the 
same as for experiment 7, which shows that, in the model, 
conformity may allow a market to become locked into an inferior 
product that exhibits quality below their personal desire. 
5. BREAKING A LOCK-IN 
From the sensitivity analysis carried out in experiments 1-8 we 
realise overcoming the network effect will be of major importance 
to breaking an existing lock-in. We test two hypothesised methods 
to breaking a lock-in, which include:  
 advertising, whereby the advertisement will inform the 
consumers of the superior product and we observe the market 
dynamics after the advertisement; and 
 free product give away, where we observe how giving 
consumers a free sample affects the dynamics of the market. 
To achieve this we create a market lock-in, and then utilise the 
strategies outlined and evaluate their success in overcoming a 
market locked into a lone product. 
5.1 Advertising 
We assume advertising alerts a consumer to a product’s claimed 
quality in a market and that the claimed quality is an accurate 
representation of the actual product quality, represented by the 
mean of the product distribution. Furthermore, we also assume 
consumers accept this information without reservation. We start 
the simulation by creating a lock-in, and then introduce the new 
competing product.  
5.1.1 Experiment 
We have two products, the market is currently locked into product 
A, and product B is the competing product. We initially set the 
consumer’s , and allow the market to reach a stable 
equilibrium. When a consumer receives advertising we set for 
the consumer to the mean of the product distribution, 0.8. 
The consumers will only learn the true quality of product B when 
they experience the product. If the consumer experienced product 
B before the advertisement, the advert does not alter their 
experienced value . Consumers start with their true experience 
(  of product A, and product A as their current choice; this 
represents an existing lock-in to product A. We then conduct the 
simulation and advertise product B in the 10th simulation step. 
Table 5 shows the settings utilised for the distributions in 
experiments 9 and 10. In experiment 9 consumers do not receive 
any advertising with regards to quality of product B, while 
experiment 10 advertises the quality of product B in the 10th step 
of the simulation. The advertised quality of product B is the mean 
of the product distribution, 0.8, which consumers adopt. 
Table 5 Advertising attempts to break the prior lock-in of product A. 
Expt QA distribution QB distribution Follower tendency 
distribution 
9    
10    
5.1.2 Results 
The results of experiment 9, where the consumers receive no 
advertising with regards to the product, are shown in figure 2. We 
observe that product B only captures around 1% of the market, 
irrespective of network type, failing to break the lock-in. This 
indicates the power of follower tendency during a lock-in, as only 
consumers dissatisfied with product A and with very weak 
follower tendency purchase product B. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage market share of product B during experiment 9. 
Consumers consider local and global networks when making 
decisions, but Product B is not known to generally be superior until 
first consumed. 
Figure 3 shows the results of experiment 10, where we observe 
that advertising manages to reverse a lock-in to product B. By 
contrast, advertising in a global network resulted in a 10% market 
share gain. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage market share of product B during experiment 
10. Consumers consider a local network when making decisions, but 
advertising of product B occurs in the 10th simulation step. 
Examining the spatial representation for the local network in 
experiment 10, shown in Figure 4, illustrates how this lock-in was 
reversed after advertising. Local regions are formed and grow, 
gaining momentum and enables all agents to try the superior 
product. Within a global network a region may not form as the 
neighbourhood size is sufficiently large that the effects of an 
anomaly at the local level are insignificant globally. 
 
Figure 4: Spatial representations of local (top) and global (bottom) 
networks during Experiment 10. The first image in each row is the 
spatial representation at step 10 of the simulation, with the second 
image showing step 15 and the last image showing the final field state. 
Product A is red, Product B is blue. 
5.2 Free give-away 
We test our hypothesis that a method of breaking a lock-in is to 
give away a free sample of your product to a proportion of the 
population. This is a practice adopted by marketers in an attempt 
to start trends. 
5.2.1 Experiment 
At the beginning of the simulation, all consumers are locked in 
product A. During a simulation, a percentage of the population, 
selected at random, receive a free product during one turn of the 
simulation. This free give-away is in place of the consumer’s 
decision making (at that step), and the consumer experiences the 
product during the give-away as if they had selected it. Table 6 
shows the settings for the experiments in the free give-away. 
Table 6 Experimental settings to break a lock-in through free give-
aways of product B. 
Expt QA distribution QB distribution Follower tendency 
distribution 
11    
12    
 
All consumers start the simulation with , and learn its 
true quality upon initial purchase or receipt of a give-away. 
Consumers draw experience of product A, and product A is set as 
their current choice, to represent the current market lock-in of 
product A. The give–away of product B occurs in the 10th 
simulation step, with all agents not given a free sample deciding 
which product to choose afterwards. When a consumer is given a 
product, it draws its experience of the product (if not previously 
experienced) and is not allowed to choose another product until 
the following simulation step. 
5.2.2 Results 
Experiment 11 uses the same product quality distribution for both 
products A and B. The effect is to simulate a competing product 
of equal quality entering an already dominated market. We utilise 
four different levels of free give-away. 
The results of experiment 11 at a range of population percentage 
free give-aways are plotted in Figure 5. It should be noted that a 
greater portion of the population sample product B during the free 
give-away than proportion of the population received the free 
product, an initial surge in consumers purchasing product B. 
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However, despite the increased uptake, equilibrium returns with 
product A retaining its lock-in of the market. 
 
Figure 5: Percentage market share of product B during experiment 
11. Each line represents the result of the percentage of population 
given product B in the 10th simulation step as shown in the legend. A 
local network is considered during consumer choices. 
Figure 6 shows that no other consumers try product B during the 
free give-away under global network, and equilibrium quickly 
returns with product A retaining a lock-in. 
 
Figure 6: Percentage market share of product B during experiment 
11. Each line represents the result of the percentage of population 
given product B in the 10th simulation step as shown in the legend. A 
global network is considered during consumer choices.  
Experiment 12 repeats Experiment 11’s settings, but we use a 
higher mean product quality distribution for product B compared 
to product A. We are simulating a free give-away of a superior 
product into a market already locked-into a competitor’s product. 
The results for experiment 12, under a local network, are plotted 
in Figure 7. These results illustrate that a greater portion of the 
population sample product B during the free give-away than 
proportion of the population received the free product. 
Additionally, a significantly higher proportion of the population 
retains their choice than during experiment 11, and the lock-in is 
broken as the proportion of the population receiving the free give-
away increases. 
 
Figure 7: Percentage market share of product B during experiment 
12. Each line represents the result of the percentage of population 
given product B in the 10th simulation step as shown in the legend. A 
local network is considered during consumer choices. 
The results from experiment 12 are plotted in Figure 8, where a 
global network fails to have the lock-in broken unless the greater 
majority of the market is given the free product. 
 
Figure 8: Percentage market share of product B during experiment 
12. Each line represents the result of the percentage of population 
given product B in the 10th simulation step as shown in the legend. A 
global network is considered during consumer choices. 
The spatial representation of simulations in Experiment 12 is 
displayed in figure 9, where local network effects allow the 
formation of regions where consumers become locked into the 
competing product. These regions persist for the duration of the 
simulation. 
       
Figure 9: The spatial representation of a simulation during 
experiment 12 at 20% free give-away. After the initial give-away (first 
image) very little regionalised lock-in is evident. The subsequent 
images are 2 and 5 steps later respectively, where regionalised lock-in 
has occurred. Such regionalised lock-in allows a product to break the 
overall market lock-in of product A. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
We made several simple assumptions during the creation of our 
model: the two products have an identical distribution on quality 
(in most experiments), consumer decisions are based upon 
product quality and the neighbouring consumer’s decision 
choices, tempered by a consumers certain degree of follower 
tendency. We found that when considering a local network the 
consumers would form regions within the global population, 
where consumers are locked into one product, but overall no 
market lock-in existed. Under a global network a market lock-in 
to one product would occur, mirroring Arthur’s finding [1]. 
Simulating specific market types altering the network externality 
strength further reinforced findings related to Arthur’s model of 
no returns1 [1]. When follower tendency is universally low, 
indicating little rationality in conforming against your own 
personal evaluation of a product, we found that the market 
retained an approximate 50-50 equilibrium. 
We then tested hypotheses to break an existing lock-in. We 
assumed an equal product distribution and found that it was not 
possible to break an existing product lock-in under equal product 
qualities, using either of the two hypothesised methods of free-
give away and advertising; under those conditions consumers 
would not find it rational to deviate from the most popular choice. 
This is in keeping with empirical studies where significant 
improvements in product quality are required to displace a locked 
in product [10]. 
Altering the assumptions slightly to allow a superior product to be 
introduced, we found the key factor in breaking a lock-in 
depended upon the network dynamics, the local network 
consideration; local conformity allowed regions to develop which 
may spread throughout the population. A similar result was found 
when comparing the results of a free give-away. We found that 
the local conformity network allows a free give-away to create a 
region locked into a singular product, with the degree of success 
in the breaking of a lock-in linked to the magnitude of the give-
away. Formation of niche areas of a product allows the spread of 
the product to permeate the population. 
7. CONCLUSION 
We created a model that is the first to focus on exploring the basic 
dynamics of breaking a lock-in, without account for properties 
specific to certain markets (e.g. switching costs). Using simple 
assumptions with regards to a consumer purchase decision being 
based only upon the perceived quality of the products and 
conformity with their neighbours, we observed that methods 
which overcame a lock-in exhibited similar patterns. Lock-in was 
only successfully overcome if spatial regions of the superior 
product are formed within the population locked into the inferior 
product. Future work would focus upon targeting specific regions 
related to consumers, and investigate the affect of such specific 
targeting over the more general approach exhibited here. 
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